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The impact of negotiated exchange on
trust and trustworthiness
Davide Barrera ∗
ICS/Department of Sociology, Utrecht University, Heidelberglaan 2,
3584 CS Utrecht, The Netherlands
Abstract
Negotiated exchanges and trust problems can be regarded as two different forms of exchange, the former
representing exchanges with negotiation and binding contracts, the latter representing asymmetric trans-
actions in which one actor has the opportunity to deceive the other. Both forms of exchange have been
extensively studied, but the two respective research traditions exhibit very little overlap. In this paper, we
investigate the effects of negotiated exchanges in different network structures on the development of mutual
trust. We derive hypotheses from various theories and test them by means of an experiment in which sub-
jects first undertake a series of negotiated exchanges under different power conditions, and then face a trust
problem with one of the actors that have been involved in the previous exchanges. The trust problem is oper-
ationalized by means of the Investment Game which allows us to look separately at trust and trustworthiness.
Our results demonstrate that negotiated exchanges increase mutual trust, but not trustworthiness.
© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Since the beginning of the eighties “social exchange” and “trust” have been extensively studied
by scholars from different disciplines such as sociology, social psychology, economics, and busi-
ness administration. The social exchange tradition concentrated predominantly on negotiation in
small exchange networks. Research on trust, on the other hand, has mainly focused on the role
of trust as a “lubricant for cooperation” (Arrow, 1974; p. 23). Albeit many social exchanges in
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real-life involve trust (e.g., economic transactions or labor relations), the two topics have been
continuously kept separated and the two research traditions exhibit very little overlap (Molm et
al., 2000; Kollock, 1994 are two exceptions). Research on social exchange focuses on exchanges
that involve negotiation and result in binding agreements. Conversely, research on trust focuses
on exchanges that do not necessarily involve negotiation and result in non-binding agreements.
Thus, in negotiated exchanges, actors typically cannot deceive each other, whereas the risk of
deception is one of the key features of trust problems. However, the distinction between trust
problems and negotiated exchanges is never so sharp in real-life situations. For example, two
firms engaged in an economic transaction with each other might undertake extensive negotiations
over the specific terms of the exchange and draw up a detailed contract specifying reciprocal
obligations, thus minimizing the risk of deception. On the other hand, if the two firms have an
established commercial relation involving repeated transactions, they might come to learn about
the trustworthiness of the partner and develop some form of mutual commitment economizing on
the legal expenses for writing extensive contracts (see Macaulay, 1963 for a classical study of the
role of legal sanctions in exchange relationships). In this way, a relationship regulated by fully
binding agreements can develop into a relationship based on mutual trust.1 Nevertheless, the two
firms could bargain from different power positions, for example, because alternative exchange
partners are available to only one of them. How would the negotiation between two such partners
affect the development of mutual trust?
Research on the effects of negotiation in exchanges concerns, on the one hand, social psycho-
logical literature on the development of commitments and group formation (Lawler and Yoon,
1993, 1996, 1998; Lawler, 2001) and, on the other hand, research on economic contracts (Sitkin,
1995; Malhothra and Murnighan, 2002). The first line of research has paid little attention to the
emergence of interpersonal trust, focusing instead on the effects of repeated exchanges between
actors embedded in different types of power relationships on relational commitment and affection.
The body of research produced in this line indicates emotions that are associated with the exchange
as the explanatory mechanism for the development of committed relationships (see Thye et al.,
2002 for a review of the research program). The second line of research focuses on the effects
of negotiation and contracts on trust. In the literature on contracts, two contrasting arguments are
found: one stressing the positive effects of contracts on trust, the other emphasizing the negative
effects. The “positive effects” argument claims that contracts are used to overcome initial trust
problems in economic transaction. Thus, contracts are useful in order to establish cooperation
between strangers (see Sitkin, 1995 for an example in this line of research). The counterargu-
ment focuses on the importance of risk in the development of trust relations. According to this
argument, when actors have the possibility and the incentive to deceive their partners but keep
themselves from doing it, they are showing that they can be trusted. Therefore, the option for
the actors to deceive their partner is considered an essential element for the development of a
trusting relation and formal contracts, insofar as they remove this option, do not allow trust to
develop (Malhothra and Murnighan, 2002). Theoretically, assuming that actors cannot assess their
partners’ trustworthiness if they do not run the risk of being deceived, two scenarios are possible:
either the level of interpersonal trust does not change after negotiated exchanges have taken place,
or the level of interpersonal trust decreases after actors have had negotiated exchanges resulting in
binding agreements. According to the first scenario, the effects of contracts on interpersonal trust
1 Consistent with this argument, contractual safeguards have been studied as means to reduce trust problems while the
extent of formal safeguards in contracts has been taken as a measure for lack of trust (Buskens, 2002, Chapter 5; Batenburg
et al., 2003).
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would actually be null rather than negative, while they would be truly negative only in the second
scenario. However, the second scenario requires some additional assumptions about the actors’
cognitive response to contracts, for example framing effects: a request of a contract contemplat-
ing all possible mishaps and deceptions might convey a non-cooperative signal to the partner
(Lindenberg, 2000), or cause her attention to focus more on the risks involved in the transaction,
so that, once the contract is removed, trust is more problematic. Nevertheless, in the literature
these two scenarios are not theoretically distinguished (e.g., Molm et al., 2000; Malhothra and
Murnighan, 2002). The main aim of this study is precisely to look at whether the effects of negoti-
ation on trust are positive, negative, or null. We test these three alternative hypotheses against each
other by comparing levels of trust between pairs of actors who underwent negotiated exchanges
and pairs of actors who did not have any previous exchange with each other. Additionally, we
adopt an experimental design that allows us to test whether power differences between negotiating
actors affect trust and in which direction.
In one of the few studies that focused on the effects of repeated exchanges on the emergence
of commitment and mutual trust, Molm et al. (2000) measured trust by means of a single-item
attitudinal question. However, in a recent study about the measurement of trust, Glaeser et al.
(2000) found that attitudinal measures of trust predict trustworthy behavior better than trusting
behavior. Therefore, we apply a behavioral measure of trust in order to overcome potential validity
problems concerning attitudinal measures of trusting behavior: we operationalize trust using the
Investment Game devised by Berg et al. (1995). This design also allows us to analyze separately
the effects of negotiated exchanges on trusting as well as trustworthy behavior.
2. Theories and hypotheses
Before we outline our theoretical arguments we will now briefly introduce negotiated exchanges
and trust and describe the Investment Game, which we also adopt in the experiment to obtain
behavioural measures of trust and trustworthiness. Research in network exchange has focused
especially on the development of theoretical models predicting the division of a given pool of
resources in negotiated exchanges. The experimental manipulation of simple networks allows
scholars to study human activity, such as power exercise, resulting from restrictions imposed
by given social structures. Actors exercise power exploiting the opportunities that the structure
offers to them in order to obtain greater benefits from the interaction (see Willer, 1999). Network
exchange theorists usually consider settings in which actors are embedded in a given network
structure that specifies exchange relations available to them. Formalized theoretical models are
used to predict actual exchanges and their outcomes and the predictions are tested in laboratory
experiments. The exercise of power is inferred from the transfer of valued resources observed
between actors embedded in a network. Actors high in power gain most of the resources available
to the exchange. Assuming that individuals try to maximize their earnings, power in exchange
networks depends on the possibility that one or more actors are excluded from exchange. A
network in which, under specific exchange conditions, one or more actors are necessarily excluded
is called strong power. More precisely, “a network is strong power if and only if (1) its positions
can be divided into one or more high power positions that are never excluded, (2) two or more
low power positions, at least one of which is always excluded, and (3) low power positions
can exchange only with high power positions” (Willer, 1999, pp. 56–57). For example, Fig. 1a
represents a simple dyad in which the two positions A and B are perfectly identical. Such an
exchange relation does not contain power differences, therefore the exchange rate between A
and B is the equal power ratio and the relation AB is called equipower. Fig. 1b, on the other
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Fig. 1. Network structures: equal power vs. strong power. (a) Dyad and (b) Branch31.
hand, represents a four actors network called branch31. If the actors in this network are allowed
to complete only one exchange, position A has a structural advantage over the three peripheral
actors, because two of them will necessarily be excluded from exchange while A can never be
excluded. Thus, actors occupying positions B, C, and D will offer exchange rates increasingly
favoring actor A trying to avoid exclusion, and actor A will gain most of the resources available
to the exchange. Therefore, position A is high in power while positions B, C, and D are low in
power. Several contrasting theoretical models to predict rates in negotiated exchanges have been
proposed. Although they are based on different assumptions about the actor, most of these theories
make rather accurate predictions on the division of resources for these simple networks. For a
comparison of most of these theories see Lovaglia et al. (1995) and Skvoretz and Willer (1993)
or the special issues of Social Networks 14, No. 3–4.
Following Coleman (1990, Chapter 5), we conceptualize trust as an interaction involving two
interdependent actors. According to Coleman, a trust problem is defined by four characteris-
tics: (1) actor 1 (Ego) has the possibility of placing some resources at the disposal of actor 2
(Alter), who, in turn has the possibility to honor or abuse trust; (2) Ego prefers to place trust if
Alter honors trust, but regrets placing trust if alter abuses it; (3) there is no binding agreement
that protects Ego from the possibility that Alter abuses trust; (4) there is a time lag between
Ego’s and Alter’s decision. This definition is consistent with the game-theoretic formalizations
of the Trust Game (Camerer and Weigelt, 1988; Dasgupta, 1988; Kreps, 1990) and the Invest-
ment Game (Berg et al., 1995). These two games differ because, in the Trust Game, “trust” and
“trustworthiness” are represented by dichotomous choices – trust versus no trust, honor versus
abuse – while the Investment Game exhibits some quantitative variation both in placing trust and
in honoring or abusing trust. Since we prefer to have such a continuous measure for trust and
trustworthiness, we employ the Investment Game in our theoretical analysis as well as in our
experiment.
In the Investment Game, the two players start with an initial endowment Ei. Ego then may
send all, some, or none of her endowment to Alter.2 The amount of money that she decides
to send, denoted S1, is then multiplied by a factor m (with m > 1). Alter receives an amount
equal to m times the amount sent by Ego. Then he can decide to send back to Ego all, some,
or none of the money he has received. The amount returned by Alter – denoted R2 – is not
multiplied. After players have chosen their actions, the game ends and the payoffs are computed.
The payoff earned by Ego is E1 − S1 + R2, while the payoff earned by Alter equals E2 + mS1 −R2.
The amount that Ego is willing to send to Alter indicates the extent to which Ego trusts Alter.
Therefore, we refer to Ego’s choice S1 as trust. Conversely, the amount that Alter is willing
2 For clarity, in the description of the Investment Game, we use the female pronoun for the sender (Ego) and the male
pronoun for the receiver (Alter).
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to return to Ego represents Alter’s trustworthiness. Therefore, we refer to Alter’s choice R2 as
trustworthiness.3
Assuming perfect information and a one-shot non-cooperative game, Alter maximizes his
revenues by keeping everything Ego has sent him, thus choosing R2 = 0. Consequently, knowing
the structure of the game and anticipating Alter’s behavior, Ego will maximize her revenues by
choosing S1 = 0, since E1 − S1 < E1 if S1 > 0. Therefore, “Send nothing” and “Return nothing” are
the equilibrium choices and the payoffs at equilibrium are E1 and E2. This outcome is Pareto-
suboptimal, because both actors would prefer the payoffs yielded in the situation in which trust
is placed and honored, E1 − S1 + R2 and E2 + mS1 −R2, with S1 > 0 and R2 > S1.
This standard game-theoretic analysis of a trust problem applies to an isolated encounter
between two strangers. However, in real-life situations, trust problems are likely to occur between
actors who are embedded in a more complex setting (Granovetter, 1985). Two types of embed-
dedness can affect trust problems (Raub, 1997; Raub and Weesie, 2000; Buskens and Raub, 2002;
Barrera, 2005): first, Ego and Alter can meet repeatedly (dyadic embeddedness), and second, Ego
and Alter may have common acquaintances (network embeddedness). In negotiated exchanges
both these aspects are present, in fact actors negotiate and exchange repeatedly with each other
and they are embedded in small social networks. For trust problems occurring in such embed-
ded settings, some theoretical mechanisms based on different assumptions – i.e., partly altruistic
instead of purely selfish actors (e.g., McClintock, 1972), backward-looking rationality instead of
forward-looking rationality (Macy and Flache, 2002) – have been postulated. For a discussion of
some of these mechanisms and empirical tests we refer to Buskens and Raub (2002) and Barrera
(2005), since such a discussion exceeds the scope of this article. However, we want to stress here
that if actors are assumed to be heterogeneous, i.e., some are assumed to be (partly) altruists,
and to apply backward-looking rationality, a common past might have an influence on the actors’
decisions in a one-shot Investment Game. We will return to this point when discussing some of
our hypotheses.
Most of the literature on social exchange is generally silent about the consequences of negoti-
ated exchanges on trust and in particular about the effects of power differences on the development
of interpersonal trust. However, some scholars have investigated the effects of repeated exchanges
on the development of durable relations, as a means to reduce uncertainty involved in the exchange
(Kollock, 1994; Molm et al., 2000) or as an affective link developed through positive emotions
that actors have experienced in repeated exchanges (Lawler and Yoon, 1993, 1996, 1998; see
also Thye et al., 2002 for a review of the research program on “Relation Cohesion Theory”).
All these theories assume that actors try to maximize their earnings, although some theories add
supplementary assumptions, such as the influence of emotions.
Building on Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994) distinction between trust and assurance, and
in line with Kollock (1994) argument on uncertainty reduction, Molm et al. (2000) state that
trust develops only under the condition of risk that is only if actors are liable to be exploited
by their partners.4 Accordingly, negotiated exchanges can only provide assurance because actors
who complete a series of negotiated exchanges have no means to infer their partners’ trustwor-
3 In the economic literature, R2 is most often labeled reciprocity (e.g., Berg et al., 1995). Because this term implies some
psychological speculation about the cause of Alter’s choice R2 that we do not consider, we opted for the more neutral
trustworthiness.
4 In Yamagishi and Yamagishi’s (1994, p. 132) terms, trust is “[an] expectation of goodwill and benign intent”, whereas
assurance is “. . . an expectation of benign behavior for reasons other than goodwill of the partner . . . [and] is based on
the knowledge of the incentive structure surrounding the relationship.”
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thiness, since these exchange agreements are fully binding. Thus, they conclude that “. . . the
very mechanisms that were created to reduce risk in transactions – the negotiation of terms and
strictly binding agreements – have the unintended consequences of reducing trust in relation-
ships” (Molm et al., 2000, p. 1398). However, in their experiment, Molm et al. only compare
levels of trust between actors who experienced reciprocal and negotiated exchanges.5 Therefore,
the results of their experiment do not rule out the possibility that negotiated exchanges still may
have a positive effect on trust, though smaller than the one observed after a series of reciprocal
exchanges. Similarly, Malhotra and Murnighan (2002, p. 537) claim that “Trust can only develop
when the parties have an incentive and an opportunity not to cooperate. . . . Thus, the presence of
a contract that restricts exploitation and opportunism may make trust development very difficult.”
This conclusion is supported by experimental evidence in which transactions with and without
risk are compared. However, in the experiments presented by Malhothra and Murnighan (2002)
subjects interacted with computers and no negotiation over the terms of the exchange took place.
Therefore, also their evidence does not rule out the possibility that negotiation may have positive
effects on trust, even though these positive effects may be smaller than those observed after risky
transactions. Summarizing, if the argument of “no trust without risk of deception” holds, then
actors involved in repeated negotiated exchanges should display the same level of mutual trust
as strangers who meet for the first time and had no previous relations. Alternatively, if negotia-
tion and binding agreements are even damaging trust as Molm et al. (2000) and Malhothra and
Murnighan (2002) seem to suggest, the level of mutual trust between actors involved in repeated
negotiated exchanges should be even lower than the level of trust existing between two strangers.
Conversely, relational cohesion theory argues that actors who exchange repeatedly with each
other experience emotions, which they attribute to the relation, which, in turn, achieves an expres-
sive value (Lawler and Yoon, 1993, 1996, 1998). Thus, actors involved in repeated negotiated
exchanges should develop mutual trust as a by-product of the exchange process. Since various
theoretical arguments leading to different hypotheses can be found in the relevant literature, we
present here three competing hypotheses concerning the effects of negotiation and exchange on
mutual trust. In statistical terms, the first hypothesis, predicting no difference in the level of
trust and trustworthiness between actors who have undergone negotiated exchanges and perfect
strangers, is the null hypothesis.
Hypothesis 0. Actors who underwent repeated negotiated exchanges are as trusting and trust-
worthy as perfect strangers.
Hypothesis 1a. Actors who underwent repeated negotiated exchanges trust each other less and
are less trustworthy than perfect strangers.
Hypothesis 1b. Actors who underwent repeated negotiated exchanges trust each other more and
are more trustworthy than perfect strangers.
Until now, our discussion has focused mainly on the problem of whether negotiated exchanges
could have any influence on the level of interpersonal trust between the exchanging actors. In
the remainder of this section, we will analyze to what extent this influence may depend on what
specifically happened during the exchange period preceding the trust problem.
5 Negotiated exchanges involve a bargaining phase possibly ending with binding agreements between exchanging
partners, such as actor A selling a good to actor B. Reciprocal exchanges are sequential unilateral transfers of benefits
over time between two exchanging partners such as actor A helping actor B at time t and actor B helping actor A at time
t + 1 (Molm and Cook, 1995; Molm et al., 2000).
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Exchange networks can differ with respect to the power actors are able to exercise in order
to increase their profit from exchange. Here, we focus on equal power networks and networks
with extreme power differences, i.e., strong power networks. The effect of power on trust has
been largely neglected in the literature on social exchange. In one of the few exceptions, Molm
et al. (2000) argued that power inequality decreases mutual trust, but they focused on reciprocal
exchanges and did not look at equal power relations. The idea that equal power relations should
yield more mutual trust is also consistent with relational cohesion theory. Lawler and Yoon (1993,
1996, 1998) argue in fact that equal power relations increase the frequency of exchange, and
higher frequency of exchange implies more earnings, more positive emotions, and hence more
interpersonal trust. Assuming that the amount of resources earned by actors through the exchange
is a good individual indicator for the success of the exchange relation, we pose the following
hypothesis for actors embedded in an equal power relation:
Hypothesis 2. The higher the earnings from exchange in equal power relations, the more the
actors embedded in such relations will trust each other and the more trustworthy they will be.
However, relational cohesion theory takes the dyad as unit of analysis and hence it does not
make distinct predictions for the two members of the exchange relation. For equal power relations
this is not a problem, because in equal power relations the positions of the two actors are perfectly
symmetric with respect to power, therefore the effect of power on interpersonal trust is the same for
the two actors and there is no need to make separate predictions for A’s trust in B and B’s trust in A.
Conversely, predictions for trust relations among actors embedded in strong power networks are
more complex, due to the power asymmetry among the actors. For example, assuming that A and
B are two actors in a strong power network, and that A is a high power actor and B is a low power
actor, A’s trust in B and B’s trust in A may be differently affected by power inequality. Relational
cohesion theory argues that power inequality decreases mutual trust, but since it takes the dyad
as a unit of analysis it does not allow predictions at the individual level. Following Weiner (1986)
attribution theory, Lawler (2001) listed emotions that can be experienced in exchange relations
connecting them with the relevant social object: positive emotions such as pleasantness, pride,
gratitude and affective attachment or negative emotions such as unpleasantness, shame, anger or
affective detachment can be directed at the task, the self, the other or the social unit (i.e., the dyad).
In addition, in his “Affect Theory” of exchange, Lawler argued that when fulfilling joint tasks
characterized by a high level of shared responsibility for the success or failure, actors will tend to
attribute the resulting feelings to the social unit (i.e., dyad, group, networks) rather than to one’s
self or to the other (the exchange partner). However, a trust relation is a relation directed towards
an individual actor rather than a social unit, therefore it should not be affected by emotions that are
attributed to a different social object. If we assume that actors in repeated exchanges experience
not only “global” emotions that they attribute to the social unit, but also other emotions that they
attribute to themselves or to the other, we can expect that, if they are confronted with a trust
problem concerning the same other with whom they had negotiated exchanges before, emotions
attributed to the other will be more salient. According to Lawler (2001), these emotions attributed
to the other could include “gratitude” if the exchange was successful or “anger” if the exchange
was not successful. This conjecture could help us to generate hypotheses about trust in relations
for actors who previously exchanged in strong power networks. Earlier experiments have shown
consistently that actors high in power are always able to exchange in such networks and obtain
a greater share from the exchange. Conversely, actors low in power are either excluded from the
exchange or they are only able to obtain small amounts of points (Willer, 1999). Therefore, an
actor high in power will experience predominantly positive emotions due to high frequency of
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exchange and high earnings. A low power actor, in turn, will experience predominantly negative
emotions due to exclusion and low earnings. There is some empirical evidence that low power
actors indeed experience negative emotions (Willer et al., 1997). Assuming that the amount of
resources earned by actors through the exchange is a good individual indicator for the success
of the exchange relation, we propose the following hypotheses for high and low power actors
embedded in strong power networks:
Hypothesis 3. The more a high power actor has earned from exchanges with a low power actor,
the more the high power actor will trust the low power actor, and the more trustworthy the high
power actor will be.
Hypothesis 4. The more a low power actor has earned from exchanges with a high power actor,
the more the low power actor will trust the high power actor, and the more trustworthy the low
power actor will be.
Finally, we examine a trust problem involving two low power actors. Low power actors do
not have the possibility to exchange with each other; therefore, they do not have reasons to
attribute positive or negative emotions associated with the exchange relations to other low power
actors. The only information concerning other low power actors available to them stems from the
observation of the other low power actors’ bargaining behavior in exchanges with the high power
actor. However, since low power actors typically bid against each other in order to be included
in the exchange with the high power actor, their earnings will decline to the advantage of the
high power actor, if the competition is fierce. Assuming that a low power actor could consider the
other low power actors partially responsible for the little she managed to earn in the exchange, we
propose the following hypothesis concerning effects on a trust relation between two low power
actors.
Hypothesis 5. The less low power actors have earned in exchanges with a high power actor, the
less they will trust each other and the less trustworthy they will be.
As stated above, when introducing the Investment Game, standard forward-looking rationality,
usually assumed in Game Theory, predicts no trust and trustworthiness at equilibrium. Moreover,
standard forward-looking rationality predicts that players’ choices in the Investment Game should
be unaffected by whatever happens before the Investment Game. However, several experiments
have shown that (1) a considerable proportion of subjects cooperate when strategic rationality
predicts they should not and (2) pre-game experiences do affect subjects’ decisions (Colman,
1982). In order to account for these empirical anomalies, some scholars proposed models that
replace the assumption of purely selfish preferences with (partly) altruistic preferences. These
models assume that subjects are not only interested in their own outcomes, but also in the outcomes
obtained by the other player, by means of some value transformation. For example, a value
transformation introduced by McClintock (1972) assumes that the utility of an actor associated
with the outcome of a strategic interaction involving a second actor is a function of both her
own payoff and the payoff earned by the second actor. The dependency of individual utility
on the welfare of the partner is referred to as the actor’s social orientation. Other scholars have
modeled the individual utility function incorporating different types of altruistic preferences, such
as fairness (Rabin, 1993) and equity or inequality-aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and
Ockenfels, 2000). Since we are studying a situation in which the actors playing the Investment
Game have a common past, our experiment is particularly suitable to test hypotheses based on
such kind of altruistic models of actors. Hereafter, we will generally refer to actors characterized
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by partly altruistic preferences as prosocials, and to selfish actors who are purely interested in
maximizing their own outcomes as individualists (e.g., Van Lange et al., 1997; Van Lange, 1999).
If some actors have different, prosocial preferences, i.e., with a taste for equity and/or fairness,
“send nothing” is not necessarily the only equilibrium choice of the Investment Game. On the one
hand, a prosocial Ego, being interested in Alter’s wealth, might send a positive amount, irrespective
of the expected amount returned. On the other hand, a prosocial Alter, whose preference for fairness
or equity is strong enough, will return a positive amount to Ego. Finally, also an individualistic
Ego, who is purely interested in her own wealth, will send a positive amount if she believes that
she is dealing with a prosocial Alter. Thus, the trustworthiness of Alter – the amount he wishes to
return to Ego – is influenced by his own social orientation and preference for equity and fairness
that is by how much he is interested in the outcome obtained by Ego. Consequently, Ego’s trust in
Alter – the decision concerning how much she wishes to send him – will be affected not only by
her own social orientation and preferences, but also by her belief about Alter’s social orientation
and preferences. Given the common history the actors share, the bargaining behavior of Alter,
observed during negotiated exchanges, could influence Ego’s beliefs about social orientation
and social preferences of Alter, and consequently it could influence Ego’s trusting decision in the
Investment Game. Therefore, we propose the following two hypotheses for the effect of own social
preferences and for the effect of beliefs concerning social preferences of the partner, respectively.
Hypothesis 6. The fairer the offers by Ego in previous negotiated exchanges are, the more Ego
will trust Alter.
Hypothesis 7. The fairer the offers by Alter in previous negotiated exchanges are, the more Ego
will trust Alter and the more trustworthy Alter will be.
3. Method
In order to test the hypotheses about effects of power in negotiated exchange on the development
of interpersonal trust we designed a laboratory experiment consisting of two phases. In the first
phase, subjects negotiate the division of a pool of points under different network conditions. After
completion of the exchange phase, subjects play two Investment Games (Berg et al., 1995) –
first in the role of Ego and then in the role of Alter – with one of the persons with whom they
exchanged in the first phase. Actors who exchanged in dyads are simply re-matched with the same
partner, actors who exchanged in larger networks are matched randomly with another member
of the same exchange network. At the beginning of the Investment Game, subjects are informed
about who their partner will be. In order to ensure that subjects know they are playing with a
person they have already met in the exchange phase, we use the same labels throughout the whole
experiment. The behavior of subjects in the Investment Game is compared with that of a control
group playing the Investment Game without the initial phase of negotiated exchange.
3.1. Experimental procedure
A total of 144 subjects (undergraduate students) participated in the experiment. The first phase
of the experiment is entirely computer based. Before the beginning of the negotiations, actors run
a tutorial from which they learn how to send and accept offers using ExNet, a system of networked
PCs commonly used to run exchange experiments (Willer, 1999). The tutorial also informs the
subjects that they will partake in 15 negotiation rounds, and that in every negotiation they can
split a pool of 24 points. Every negotiation round lasts up to 2 min, during which they can send an
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unlimited number of offers to each other until an agreement is reached or the time is over. Subjects
participating in the experiment are fully informed about their own offers as well as about offers sent
and received by all other subjects in their network. Their computer screen displays the experimental
network and continuously updates the status of all offers and agreements reached. Subjects are
also told that the points earned in exchanges will be translated into money at a fixed exchange rate,
but they are not informed about the real value of every point before the end of the exchange phase,
in order to draw their attention to the second phase where the stakes are much higher. Moreover,
to avoid subjects trying to build up a cooperative reputation in the exchange phase to exploit their
partner’s trust in the Investment Game, subjects are not informed beforehand that they will play
the Investment Game at the end of the exchange phase. To study the effects of power on trust, we
implemented the negotiated exchange in two different network structures: a strong power and an
equal power (see Fig. 1). We use a branch31 for the strong power and a simple dyad for the equal
power structure. This design allows us to compare levels of trust and trustworthiness in network
structures after completion of a series of exchanges under equal versus strong power conditions. In
a third treatment, we let pairs of subjects play the Investment Games without the previous phase
of exchange. This treatment provides us with a benchmark representing the level of trust and
trustworthiness between strangers without experience of exchange and power within a network.
The second phase of the experiment is paper and pencil. At the end of the exchange phase, the
experimenter walks into the cubicle, informs the subjects about the second phase of the experiment,
and gives them written instructions. At this point, subjects are also informed about the exchange
rate applied to the points that they earned in the first phase: US$ 0.01 per point earned in the
exchange. The second phase of the experiment consists of two one-shot Investment Games in
which every subject first plays as Ego, and then plays as Alter. Instructions for the two Investment
Games are also given in two parts. First, all subjects are Egos, they receive US$ 2.50 as initial
endowment and they can decide to send a certain amount of their endowment to their partner, in
any multiple of 50 cents. They are also told that the amount they decide to send will be multiplied
by three by the experimenter and that their partner then decides how much he will return. Subjects
are not informed in the first part of the instructions that they will subsequently play as Alters
themselves with the same partner because this might induce a feeling of “reduced responsibility”
that would push the subjects to behave more opportunistically (Burks et al., 2003).6 For the
returning choice in the Investment Game, we used the strategy method (Selten, 1967): every Alter
decides on a contingent action for every possible decision of Ego. In the second instructions sheet,
subjects are required to fill in each amount that they would return to Ego for every possible amount
that Ego could send. Subjects are paid for the two Investment Games, played as Ego and Alter,
respectively. Since Alters’ decisions are collected with the strategy method, the amount returned
corresponding to the actual amount sent by Ego is implemented and paid. The experiment ends
with a small questionnaire about personal characteristics.
Given the design we chose for the second phase of the experiment, we obtain effectively a
clean measure of the trusting decisions of all our subjects in a one-shot Investment Game. It is
a one-shot Investment Game because our subjects did not know that a second Investment Game
in the role of Alter would follow. Conversely, although we stress in the instructions that the
two Investment Games are completely independent from each other, the returning decisions are
6 In an experiment specifically designed to test the effects of different procedures, Burks et al. (2003) found that playing
an Investment Game in both roles reduces the amount returned. Moreover, if subjects are informed beforehand that they
will play both roles, the amount sent decreases as well.
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effectively individual measures of trustworthiness in the second game of a two-shots Investment
Game, because all subjects make their returning decision after their sending decisions. However,
for the same reason, these returning decisions are made without knowing how much their partner
returned in the first Investment Game. Moreover, hoping to improve the quality of our measurement
for trustworthiness, we decided to use the strategy method (Selten, 1967) for the returning decision,
thus obtaining five returning decisions per every subject, one per every possible amount sent by
Ego. We are aware that this design makes our measure for trustworthiness somewhat less “clean”,
but we preferred to have two decisions (trust and trustworthiness) for every actor within a dyad,
rather than letting our subjects play a simple one-shot Investment Game and then having only one
decision (trust or trustworthiness) for every actor.7 Moreover, there is some evidence that the use
of the strategy method does not induce different behavior in the experimental subjects (Brandts
and Charness, 2000; Cason and Mui, 1998).
Our unit of analysis consists of a directed dyad. In fact, for any given pair AB, two sending
decisions and two returning decisions are observed. First, A sends to B and B sends to A. Then, A
returns to B and B returns to A. Given the setting of the first phase described above, five different
pairs of matches are possible with respect to relative power within the relation. Subjects who did
not run the exchange phase (strangers) have a null relation with respect to relative power. Subjects
who partook in the exchange phase in dyads are matched with each other in the second phase
and have an equal relation with respect to relative power. All groups of four subjects who ran
the exchange phase in branch31 networks can be matched in two types of relations differing with
respect to relative power: a low power actor with the high power actor and a low power actor with
another low power actor. Two low power actors form a symmetrical directed relation: low to low
(LTL hereafter). A low power actor and the high power actor form two directed relations differing
with respect to relative power: high to low (HTL) and low to high (LTH). Given a match AB in
which A is a high power actor and B is a low power actor, A’s trust in B and B’s trust in A are
analytically different and they are analyzed separately.
Out of 144 subjects participating in our experiment, 72 partook in the first phase in branch31
networks, 36 in dyads and 36 in the strangers treatment. Therefore, counting the single Investment
Games, we have 36 Investment Games between strangers; 36 between actors who experienced
repeated negotiated exchanges in an equal power relation; 36 between 2 low power actors (LTL)
who experienced negotiated exchanges in a branch31 network; 18 between an Ego who expe-
rienced negotiated exchanges in a branch31 network as a low power actor, and an Alter who
experienced negotiated exchanges in a branch31 network as a high power actor (LTH); 18 between
an Ego who experienced negotiated exchanges in a branch31 network as a high power actor, and
an Alter who experienced negotiated exchanges in a branch31 network as a low power actor
(HTL).
3.2. Operationalizations
The amount sent by each subject in the role of Ego is the individual measure for trust that
we use as dependent variable in the regression models presented in the next section in Table 1.
Trustworthiness is the amount returned. Since we used the strategy method for trustworthiness,
subjects made 5 decisions, one per every possible value of the amount sent by the partner in
the Investment Game. In the regression models presented in the next section in Table 2, we






Linear regression models on trust (144 subject, 54 networks)
Hypotheses Independent variables Expected sign Coeff. (standard error)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
H0–H1a–H1b Equal 0 − + 0.86** (0.347) 0.72** (0.343) 0.86*** (0.321) 0.71** (0.315)
H0–H1a–H1b HTL 0 − + 0.75** (0.361) 0.72** (0.356) 0.77** (0.326) 0.73** (0.327)
H0–H1a–H1b LTH 0 − + 0.14 (0.420) 0.34 (0.476) 0.43 (0.483) 0.25 (0.479)
H0–H1a–H1b LTL 0 − + 0.11 (0.333) 0.03 (0.339) 0.08 (0.331) 0.17 (0.334)
H2–H3–H4–H5 Individual earnings + 0.22 (0.192) 0.19 (0.192) −0.22 (0.266)
H6 Average offer by Ego + 0.22 (0.143) 0.24* (0.143) 0.28** (0.137)
H7 Average offer by Alter + 0.21 (0.131) 0.25* (0.134) 0.05 (0.140)
Sex (female = 1) −0.49 (0.307) −0.45 (0.308)
Trust (knowledge-based) 0.24* (0.124) 0.27** (0.127)
Trust (general) 0.26* (0.137) 0.22* (0.132)
(H2–H3–H4)a Individual earnings × same partner ?a 0.75** (0.281)
Constant 10.97*** (0.203) 10.97*** (0.205) 20.25*** (0.323) 20.23*** (0.323)
R2 0.056 0.089 0.151 0.178
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 two-sided significance based on Huber standard errors modified for clustering within networks.
a This term shows how the effects of earnings postulated by Hypotheses 2–4, differ between subjects depending on whether they played the Investment Game with the same
subject with whom they had exchanges.
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summarized these five decisions into one variable taking the average proportion returned. Alter’s
five returning decisions corresponding to different possible amounts sent by Ego could also be
analyzed separately, but preliminary analyses showed that the amount returned depends almost
linearly on the amount received. Therefore, the use of the average proportion returned does not
imply any loss of information.
Our main independent variable is the experimental condition representing the type of power
relation experienced in the first phase. Other independent measures refer to the subjects’ behavior
during the negotiations in phase 1 of our experiment. We used individual earnings in the exchange
as an individual measure for the success of the exchange relation. Since individual earnings are
obviously strongly affected by the power position of the actor in the exchange relation we standard-
ized this measure within power conditions. We realize this is a deviation from relational cohesion
theory arguments but it has the additional advantage to make comparison across experimental
conditions possible. Assuming that in negotiated exchanges prosocial types offer more points
to their partner and individualistic types offer fewer points, we take the average amount offered
by the actors during the negotiation phase as a measure of social preference. Since offers differ
systematically between different types of exchange relations, also this measure is standardized
within power conditions.8
At the end of the experiment, subjects fill in a short questionnaire in which we ask for some
personal characteristics that we then use as control variables in our analyses: sex, age, and
major. The questionnaire also included an 18 items trust scale. Some of the items are adopted
from Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994) and Wrightsmann (1974). Eight of the initial items were
excluded after reliability analysis and the remaining 10 were entered in a factor analysis. Two
factors were found and the standardized scores were used as trust indices. The first factor loads
stronger on items referring to a preference for dealing with others with whom the respondent
has a long-lasting relation. This factor can be compared to Yamagishi and Yamagishi’s (1994,
p. 151) “knowledge-based trust.” The second factor represents a general positive and benign
attitude and can be compared with Yamagishi and Yamagishi’s (1994, p. 147) “general trust
scale.”
Our data have a multilevel structure, because observations are clustered within networks (or
dyads). Therefore, all hypotheses are tested by means of linear regressions with robust (Huber)
standard errors modified for clustering within networks (Huber, 1967; Rogers, 1993). Alter-
natively, one could estimate a multilevel model with random effects for the network level.
However, we decided to present results obtained with linear regression models with robust
estimation for three reasons. First, this model is actually more conservative than a multilevel
model. It estimates standard errors taking into account that observations belonging to the same
network are not independent, but it requires less strict assumptions about the sampling dis-
tributions, and we are not sure that the assumptions required by multilevel modeling would
be met by our data. Second, we tried estimating a multilevel model anyway, and the random
effect referring to the network level was estimated at zero. Third, the significance levels of all
variables are slightly different using a multilevel model but the substantive message does not
differ.
8 We preferred not to use a standard measure of social orientation (i.e., Liebrand, 1984) because we feared that this
could provide a specific frame thus influencing actors’ subsequent decisions.
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4. Results
4.1. Trust
Concerning the exchange phase of the experiment, actors in dyads settled on an equal split
of the resources available to the exchange, whereas in the branch31 high power actors gained
considerably more than low power actors, as predicted by network exchange theory. Table 1
presents four regression models on trust. Model 1 only includes the four variables representing
four different power relations, This model tests the competing Hypotheses 0–1b. Model 2 adds the
individual earnings from the exchange phase (referring to Hypotheses 2–5), the average amount
offered by Ego in the bargaining process (Hypothesis 6), and the average amount offered by Alter
in the bargaining process (Hypothesis 7). Model 3 presents the same variables included in model
2, but now controlling for personal characteristics of the subjects, namely sex and the two trust
indices. Finally, model 4 includes also an interaction term between own earnings and a dummy
variable which takes value 1 if the trust problem involves the same couple who previously had
an exchange relation, and 0 if not. This term has been included in order to test whether the effect
of individual earnings differs between those subjects who had previous exchange with each other
and those who did not (i.e., LTL).
In model 1 the power relations are entered as dummies and our control group (strangers) is the
reference category. Actors in equal power relations and high power actors display more trust than
strangers, while low power actors do not differ significantly from strangers, regardless of who their
partner is. Therefore, for equal power relations, Hypothesis 1b is supported and the null Hypothesis
0 can be rejected. Conversely, for relations between actors embedded in strong power networks,
results differ depending on power position: for high power actors Hypothesis 1b is supported and
Hypothesis 0 is rejected, while for low power actors neither Hypothesis 1a nor Hypothesis 1b is
supported and the null Hypothesis 0 cannot be rejected. These results are robust and consistent
in all four models. Conversely, we need to be more cautious when drawing conclusions on the
remaining hypotheses. The significance levels of the variables referring to Hypotheses 2–7 are in
fact somewhat instable across the four models and the effects of these variables are not always
statistically significant. More specifically, the effect of individual earnings from the exchange is
never significant. However, running the same analyses separately for the four groups referring
to different power conditions we discovered that individual earnings have a positive effect for
equal power, HTL, and LTH relations, but no effect for LTL relations. Thus, in model 4, we
introduced an additional term in order to disentangle these two effects. We did this by adding an
interaction between individual earnings and a dummy which takes value 1 if the subject plays
the Investment Game with the same person with whom she had previous negotiated exchanges
and 0 otherwise. Therefore, in model 4, the coefficient of the main effect of individual earnings
represents now this effect for actors in the LTL power relation, whereas the interaction term
indicates how this effect differs for the subjects who played the Investment Game with a subject
with whom they had negotiated exchanges.9 Thus, model 4 shows that the effect of individual
earnings differs significantly depending on whether a subject played the Investment Game with
the same subject with whom he or she had previous exchanges. This effect is actually positive and
significant (p = 0.005, one-sided) for subjects who played with the same partner with whom they
9 The coefficient of the main effect of “individual earnings” in model 4 represents the effects for LTL because the
earnings of strangers are obviously 0 since they did not have negotiated exchanges before the Investment Game.
522 D. Barrera / Social Networks 29 (2007) 508–526
Table 2
Linear regression model on trustworthiness (144 subject, 54 networks)
Hypotheses Independent variables Expected sign Coeff. (standard error)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
H0–H1a–H1b Equal 0 − + −0.00 (0.042) −0.01 (0.042) −0.05 (0.046)
H0–H1a–H1b HTL 0 − + 0.05 (0.036) −0.05 (0.036) 0.00 (0.040)
H0–H1a–H1b LTH 0 − + −0.04 (0.071) −0.04 (0.074) −0.05 (0.055)
H0–H1a–H1b LTL 0 − + −0.05 (0.045) −0.04 (0.045) −0.06 (0.041)
H2–H3–H4–H5 Individual earnings + 0.02 (0.019) 0.01 (0.017)
H7 Average offer by Alter + 0.00 (0.023) −0.01 (0.021)
Amount sent 0.05*** (0.014)
Sex (female = 1) 0.07* (0.038)
Trust (knowledge-based) 0.00 (0.018)
Trust (general) 0.03* (0.018)
Constant 0.35*** (0.029) 0.35*** (0.029) 0.20*** (0.052)
R2 0.023 0.031 0.194
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01 two-sided significance based on Huber standard errors modified for clustering within
networks.
had previous exchanges (i.e., equal power, HTL, and LTH), and negative and not significant for
the others. This implies that Hypotheses 2–4 are supported, while Hypothesis 5 is not supported.
Concerning Hypotheses 6 and 7, our analyses provide some evidence supporting the predicted
effects of individual social orientations. However, the statistical evidence supporting Hypotheses
6 and 7 is weak and somewhat unstable across models, the p values for these two variables are
slightly above or slightly below 0.05 one-sided, depending on which other variables are included
in the model.10 The instability of these effects could be due to the fact that our population is
rather small, or perhaps our experimental design did not provide us with enough variation on the
relevant variables to be able to perform a strong test of these hypotheses. Finally, in models 3 and
4, we found no difference in amount sent between men and women, and some significant effects
of the two trust indices: actors who score higher on these two indices are sending slightly more.
4.2. Trustworthiness
Table 2 displays three linear regression models on average percentage returned. In this case
we present three models. Unlike our previous analysis on trust, these models show that only
some of the control variables included in model 3 have significant effects on trustworthiness.
The experimental manipulations, individual earnings, and the other variables representing the
behavior of subjects during the bargaining phase, have no significant effect on trustworthiness.
In model 1, none of the effects of the power relations is significant, thus for the effects of
repeated exchanges on trustworthiness the null Hypothesis 0 cannot be rejected and neither
Hypothesis 1a nor Hypothesis 1b is supported: repeated exchanges do not increase or decrease
trustworthy behavior under any power condition. Interestingly, however, high power actors seem
10 In model 4, the effect of the average offer by Alter drops because this variable correlates with the interaction term,
individual earnings for subjects playing with the same partner. Therefore, in model 4, we cannot distinguish the effects
of own earnings from the effects of offers sent by Alter.
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to return on average slightly more than actors embedded in any other type of power relations. In
particular, focusing on branch31 networks, the difference in trustworthy behavior between high
power and low power actors is statistically significant (t = −1.73, p = 0.04). Thus, high power
actors are both more trusting and more trustworthy than low power actors.11 This result implies
that power differences damage trust relations because high power actors tend to be overconfident
and run the risk of being exploited, whereas low power actors might lose good opportunities by
being excessively distrustful.
Looking at personal characteristics, the average proportion returned increases especially with
the amount sent. Note that, since every subject played the Investment Game twice, first as Ego
and then as Alter, “amount sent” does not indicate the amount received by the actor in the position
of Alter, but the amount sent by the same actor when playing as Ego in the first Investment Game.
Thus, the positive effect of “amount sent” in these models means that subjects who send more
also return more. Furthermore, women return slightly more than men and attitudinal trust, as
measured by our general trust scale, increases slightly the amount returned, while the second trust
index, knowledge-based trust, has no significant effect on the amount returned. These results are
comparable with Glaeser et al. (2000) who found that attitudinal trust, as measured by the GSS
questionnaire, predicts trustworthiness better than trusting behavior.
In preliminary analyses, we found that the amount returned depends linearly on the amount
received. Therefore, in our study it appears that the use of strategy method (Selten, 1967) does
not yield additional insights. Moreover, although other studies indicated that the strategy method
does not alter subjects’ choices (Brandts and Charness, 2000; Cason and Mui, 1998), it is possible
that, in our study, this linear relation between amount received and amount returned prevented
the observation of other effects related to the exchange. Analyzing an Investment Game played in
both roles, Burks et al. (2003) found that playing both roles reduces the amount returned, possibly
because actors perceived a “reduced responsibility” for inequalities in the outcomes. Thus, in
our experiment, returning decisions were possibly influenced both by “reduced responsibility”,
due to the fact that actors played both roles, and by a linear relation with the amount received
presumably induced by the use of strategy method. In other words, our subjects based their five
returning decisions almost solely on the five corresponding amount received.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we study the effects of power in negotiated exchanges on the development of
interpersonal trust. We devised a specific experiment in which actors first experience a phase
of negotiated exchange within given exchange relations and subsequently play an Investment
Game with one of their exchange partners, first in the role of Ego and then in the role of Alter.
The Investment Game provides a behavioral measure of trusting as well as trustworthy behavior.
We compared levels of trust and trustworthiness among actors exchanging in an equal power
relation and in a branch31 with the behavior of two strangers with no experience of previous
exchanges. We presented a set of hypotheses based on the literature on commitment and affection
11 The fact that high power actors both sent more and returned more in the Investment Game might also suggest that
these actors are simply more generous rather than more trusting and trustworthy. Particularly, this explanation holds if
we assume that actors who earn more in the exchange phase perceive this as unfair with respect to low power actors who
were typically exploited in negotiated exchanges. Given the available data, this explanation cannot be excluded, but such
an hypothesis could be tested by running a new session of the experiment with an additional manipulation, for example,
letting high power actors play a dictator game with low power actors after the negotiated exchanges.
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in exchange relationships and on individual social preferences. On the one hand, results show that
repeated negotiated exchanges in equal power relations increase trust. Within relations between
actors embedded in strong power networks, high power actors display a higher level of trust than
strangers, whereas the trusting behavior of low power actors does not differ from the behavior
of perfect strangers. On the other hand, repeated negotiated exchanges do not affect trustworthy
behavior. Trustworthy behavior seems in fact to depend more on personal characteristics than on
what happened in the exchange phase. Comparing predictions stemming from different theories,
we found some evidence for relational cohesion theory as well as for the effects of individual
social preferences. There is some indication that subjects learn about their partners observing how
they bargain, and that they also are influenced by their own social preferences, but the statistical
evidence for these effects is rather weak. Interestingly, individual earnings affect subsequent
trusting behavior only if they can be related to the behavior of the partner.
Our results imply that successful exchanges in equal power or high power positions promote
trust, but this trust seems to be unjustified because actors in equal power or low power position
do not become more trustworthy towards their partners. Conversely, low power actors are just as
trusting as strangers, both when they are matched with another low power actor and when they are
matched with a high power actor. However, in the latter case they could be more trusting instead,
because high power actors are more trustworthy than low power actors.
In this paper the relation between negotiation in repeated exchanges and trust is investigated
adopting a behavioral rather than attitudinal measure for trust as well as trustworthiness. The
results call for more research into this area. In particular, more theoretical work is needed to
understand what micro-mechanism produces the differences in trust levels that we observed.
Existing theories stress the role of emotions but focus on the dyad as a unit of analysis. Trusting
decisions are intrinsically individual, thus a theory of trust in exchange relations should address
how actors assess their partner’s trustworthiness from the information they obtain negotiating
with her. The results presented here suggest that backward-looking rationality and heterogeneous
actors could be important elements of such a theory. Finally, although most theories claim that
trust depends on the expectations subjects have with respect to the motives of the trusted actor, i.e.,
her trustworthiness, sociological research has been disproportionately devoted to study trust. The
difficulty encountered here in predicting trustworthy behavior shows that trustworthiness should
be placed much higher on our research agenda.
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